Electrophysiological correlates of self-related processing in adults with autism.

The term "self-bias" refers to the human propensity to prioritize self- over other-related stimuli and is believed to influence various stages of the processing stream. By means of event-related potentials (ERPs), it was recently shown that the self-bias in a shape-label matching task modulates early as well as later phases of information processing in neurotypicals. Recent claims suggest autism-related deficits to specifically impact later stages of self-related processing; however, it is unclear whether these claims hold based on current findings. Using the shape-label matching task while recording ERPs in individuals with autism can clarify which stage of self-related processing is specifically affected in this condition. Therefore, this study sought to investigate the temporal course of self-related processing in adults with and without autism. Thirty-two adults with autism and 27 neurotypicals completed a shape-label matching task while ERPs were concomitantly recorded. At the behavioral level, results furnished evidence for a comparable self-bias across groups, with no differences in task performance between adults with and without autism. At the ERP level, the two groups showed a similar self-bias at early stages of self-related information processing (the N1 component). Conversely, the autism group manifested a lessened differentiation between self- and other-related stimuli at later stages (the parietal P3 component). In line with recent claims of later phases of self-related processing being altered in autism, we found an equivalent self-bias between groups at an early, sensory stage of processing, yet a strongly diminished self-bias at a later, cognitive stage in adults with autism.

Differences in own-face but not own-name discrimination between autistic and neurotypical adults: A fast periodic visual stimulation-EEG study.

Self-related processing is thought to be altered in autism, with several studies reporting that autistic individuals show a diminished neural response relative to neurotypicals for their own name and face. However, evidence remains scarce and is mostly based on event-related potential studies. Here, we used EEG to measure the neural activity of autistic adults (20 for faces, 27 for names) and neurotypical adults (24 for faces, 25 for names) while they were watching rapidly alternating faces and names, through a relatively new technique called Fast Periodic Visual Stimulation. We presented strangers' faces or names at a base frequency of 5.77 Hz, while one's own, a close other's, and a specific stranger's face/name was presented at an oddball frequency of 1.154 Hz. The neurotypical group showed a significantly greater response to their own face than both close other and stranger faces, and a greater response for close other than for stranger faces. In contrast, in the autism group, own and close other faces showed stronger responses than the stranger's face, but the difference between own and close other faces was not significant in a bilateral parieto-occipital cluster. No group differences in the enhanced response to familiar names were found. These results replicate and extend results obtained using traditional electroencephalographic techniques which suggest atypical responses to self-relevant stimuli in autism.

Adults with Autism Prefer Person-First Language in Dutch: A Cross-Country Study.

The correct language to refer to someone with a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder has received a lot of attention in recent years. Studies in English-speaking countries found a main identity-first language (IFL) preference (e.g. autistic person) opposed to a person-first language preference (PFL) (e.g. person with autism) among adults with autism. However, a recent study conducted in a Dutch-speaking country (the Netherlands) reported a PFL preference (Buijsman et al., 2023). The goal of the current study was to gain insights into language preferences in two Dutch-speaking countries and, in contrast to previous studies, give participants the option to indicate not having a specific language preference. In the current study, we asked 414 Dutch-speaking adults with autism, living either in Belgium or the Netherlands, to fill in an online questionnaire about their language preference. We found that over half of the participants had a PFL preference (54%), followed by having no preference (27%). Only 14% of them had an IFL preference, and 5% proposed another term. Having more years of education was identified as a predictor for having an IFL preference when compared to a PFL preference, while being older predicted having no preference compared to a PFL preference. The majority of Dutch-speaking adults with autism showed a PFL preference, which is in contrast to findings from English-speaking countries, but in accord with a recent study conducted in the Netherlands (Buijsman et al., 2023). Implications of this finding for language use are discussed.

Recent neural advances in studies on theory of mind and autism.

Despite initial evidence in favor of the Theory of Mind (ToM) theory of autism, results have been mixed, presumably because the literature is highly heterogeneous. Researchers have increasingly turned to neuroimaging as a tool to provide additional insights regarding ToM differences in autism. For example, they have used neuroimaging to investigate spontaneous ToM, i.e., ToM in the absence of explicit instruction. Furthermore, recent advances in hyperscanning allow to study neural responses to actual, live, social interactions. Finally, the hypothesis that there may also be difficulties with 'Theory of Own Mind' is being investigated. In short, the awareness of past shortcomings of ToM research in autism inspires many new research lines that will expectedly further insights into the outstanding questions in this field in the upcoming years.

The relevance of familiarity in the context of self-related information processing.

Humans are inclined to preferentially process self-related content, referred to as the "self-bias." Different paradigms have been used to study this effect. However, not all paradigms included a familiar other condition (but rather an unfamiliar other condition), needed to differentiate self-specific effects from the impact of familiarity. The primary goal of our study was to test the suitability for studying the self-bias of two paradigms that provide robust measures of salience effects-that is, the Repetition Blindness (RB) effect and the Emotional Stroop (ES) interference-while addressing the familiarity confound. We further explored whether self-bias effects were related to autism symptomatology, as a reduced self-bias in autism has been reported in previous research. In an online procedure, 82 adults performed an RB task and an ES task in a counterbalanced order, while being presented with both self- and familiar other-related stimuli. Results of both frequentist and Bayesian analyses did not provide evidence in favour of a specific self-bias on either task: we found no significant modulation of the RB effect, nor of the ES interference, for the own versus a close other's name. Moreover, no link with autism symptomatology was found. Tackling a crucial shortcoming from earlier studies, our investigation raises awareness on the importance of accounting for familiarity when investigating self-related processing.

Equivalent own name bias in autism: An EEG study of the Attentional Blink.

The "Attentional Blink" refers to difficulty in detecting the second of two target stimuli presented in rapid temporal succession. Studies have shown that salient target stimuli, such as one's own name, reduce the magnitude of this effect. Given indications that self-related processing is altered in autism, it is an open question whether this attentional self-bias is reduced in autism. To investigate this, in the current study we utilised an Attentional Blink paradigm involving one's own and others' names, in a group of 24 autistic adults, and 22 neurotypical adults, while measuring EEG. In line with previous studies, the Attentional Blink was reduced when the participant's own name was the second target, with no differences between autistic and neurotypical participants. ERP results show that the effect on the Attentional Blink of one's own name was reflected in increased N2 and P3 amplitudes, for both autistic and nonautistic individuals. This is the first event-related potential study of own-name processing in the context of the Attentional Blink. The results provide evidence of an intact attentional self-bias in autism, both at the behavioural and neural level.

A comparison of self-bias measures across cognitive domains.

BACKGROUND: The 'self-bias'-i.e., the human proneness to preferentially process self-relevant stimuli-is thought to be important for both self-related and social processing. Previous research operationalized the self-bias using different paradigms, assessing the size of the self-bias within a single cognitive domain. Recent studies suggested a reduced self-bias in autism, yet findings are inconsistent. The lack of consensus across existing studies may result from variation in paradigms and cognitive domains tested. Therefore, the primary goal of the current study was to investigate whether self-biases found across cognitive domains (i.e., perception, memory, attention) are related or independent. The secondary goal was to explore the relationship between these self-biases and the extent of autistic traits in a neurotypical sample. METHODS: In an online procedure, 99 Dutch-speaking adults performed three self-processing tasks in counterbalanced order-i.e., the shape-label matching task (perception), the trait adjectives task (memory) and the visual search task (attention)-and completed two self-report measures of ASD symptomatology, i.e., AQ-10 and SRS-A. To control for level of familiarity, self-, close other- and famous other-relevant stimuli were included in each task. Repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for each task, and both frequentist as well as Bayesian analyses were applied to investigate the correlational patterns between self-bias measures. RESULTS: We observed significant correlations of the self-bias magnitude between memory and attention, as well as attention and perception. However, Bayesian analysis provided only weak support for the latter association. Further, the size of the self-bias was not significantly related across memory and perception. No significant correlation between autistic traits and the self-bias magnitude was found for any of the three tasks, with Bayesian analyses strongly favoring the null hypothesis. CONCLUSIONS: In contrast with the view of a 'unidimensional' self-bias, our findings provide evidence for a heterogeneous and multifaceted self consisting of a variety of related and unrelated aspects. None of the self-bias indices were found to relate to autistic traits in our neurotypical sample.

The psychological impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on adults with autism: a survey study across three countries.

BACKGROUND: Previous studies have reported a negative psychological and mental health impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. This impact is likely to be stronger for people with autism as they are at heightened risk of mental health problems and because the pandemic directly affects social functioning and everyday routines. We therefore examined COVID-19 pandemic-related changes in mental health, the impact of the pandemic on their social life and routines, satisfaction with pandemic-related information and tips, and participants' wishes for guidance. METHODS: We used a mixed-method approach, collecting quantitative and qualitative survey data from adults with and without autism across three European countries: Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK (N = 1044). RESULTS: We found an increase in depression and anxiety symptoms in response to the pandemic for both the non-autism and the autism group, which was greater for adults with autism. Furthermore, adults with autism showed a greater increase in worries about their pets, work, getting medication and food, and their own safety/security. They felt more relieved from social stress, yet experienced the loss of social contact as difficult. Adults with autism also felt more stressed about the loss of routines. Pleasant changes noted by adults with autism were the increase in solidarity and reduced sensory and social overload. Adults with autism frequently reported problems with cancellation of guidance due to the pandemic and expressed their wish for (more) autism-specific information and advice. LIMITATIONS: Our sample is likely to reflect some degree of selection bias, and longitudinal studies are needed to determine long-term effects. CONCLUSIONS: Results highlight the psychological burden of the pandemic on adults with autism and shed light on how to support them during this COVID-19 pandemic, which is especially important now that the pandemic is likely to have a prolonged course. There is a need for accessible, affordable (continued) support from health services. Guidance may focus on the maintenance of a social network, and adjusting routines to the rapid ongoing changes. Finally, we may learn from the COVID-19 pandemic-related changes experienced as pleasant by adults with autism to build a more autism-friendly society post-pandemic.

No evidence for a common self-bias across cognitive domains.

It is generally acknowledged that humans have an egocentric bias; processing self-related stimuli in a specialised, preferential manner. The self-bias has been studied within cognitive domains such as memory, attention and perception; but never across cognitive domains in order to assess whether self-biases are a product of a common bias, or independent. This has relevance for conditions such as Autism Spectrum Disorder: certain self-biases are reduced in those with autism, but the pattern of results is not consistent across different cognitive domains. Self-bias was measured across the attentional and perceptual domains on two well-established tasks: the attentional blink (attention) and shape-label matching (perception) tasks. Processing of each participant's own name was compared to processing of the name of another individual very familiar to the participant (to control for familiarity), and the name of an unfamiliar other. In the attentional domain, the attentional blink for the participant's own name was reduced compared to that for the name of a familiar or unfamiliar other. In the perceptual domain, participants showed stronger associations between their own name and a geometric shape than between the other classes of names and associated shapes. Thus, strong evidence of a self-bias, independent of familiarity, was found on both tasks. However, across two experiments, the magnitude of the self-bias on the attentional blink and shape-label matching tasks was not correlated, supporting the idea that self-biases across cognitive domains are distinct. Furthermore, in contrast with extant models, neither type of self-bias was predicted by autistic traits.

Is less readable liked better? The case of font readability in poetry appreciation.

Previous research shows conflicting findings for the effect of font readability on comprehension and memory for language. It has been found that-perhaps counterintuitively-a hard to read font can be beneficial for language comprehension, especially for difficult language. Here we test how font readability influences the subjective experience of poetry reading. In three experiments we tested the influence of poem difficulty and font readability on the subjective experience of poems. We specifically predicted that font readability would have opposite effects on the subjective experience of easy versus difficult poems. Participants read poems which could be more or less difficult in terms of conceptual or structural aspects, and which were presented in a font that was either easy or more difficult to read. Participants read existing poems and subsequently rated their subjective experience (measured through four dependent variables: overall liking, perceived flow of the poem, perceived topic clarity, and perceived structure). In line with previous literature we observed a Poem Difficulty x Font Readability interaction effect for subjective measures of poetry reading. We found that participants rated easy poems as nicer when presented in an easy to read font, as compared to when presented in a hard to read font. Despite the presence of the interaction effect, we did not observe the predicted opposite effect for more difficult poems. We conclude that font readability can influence reading of easy and more difficult poems differentially, with strongest effects for easy poems.

Defining the neural correlates of spontaneous theory of mind (ToM): An fMRI multi-study investigation.

There is a major debate in the theory of mind (ToM) field, concerning whether spontaneous and explicit ToM are based on the same or two distinct cognitive systems. While extensive research on the neural correlates of explicit ToM has demonstrated involvement of the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), few studies investigated spontaneous ToM, leaving some open questions. Here, we implemented a multi-study approach by pooling data from three fMRI studies to obtain a larger sample to increase power and sensitivity to better define the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying spontaneous ToM. Participants watched videos in which an agent acquires a true or false belief about the location of a ball. Thus, the belief of the agent and that of the participant could either match or differ. Importantly, participants were never asked to consider the belief of the agent and were only instructed to press a button when they detected the presence of the ball after an occluder fell at the end of each video. By analysing the blood-oxygen level dependent signal during the belief formation phase for false versus true beliefs, we found a cluster of activation in the right, and to a lesser extent, left posterior parietal cortex spanning the TPJ, but no mPFC activation. Region of interest (ROI) analysis on bilateral TPJ and mPFC confirmed these results and added evidence to the asymmetry in laterality of the TPJ in spontaneous ToM. Interestingly, the whole brain analysis, supported by an overlap with brain maps, revealed maximum activation in areas involved in visuospatial working memory and attention switching functions, such as the supramarginal gyrus, the middle temporal gyrus, and the inferior frontal gyrus. By contrast, evidence for the presence of brain-behaviour correlations was mixed and there was no evidence for functional connectivity between the TPJ and mPFC. Taken together, these findings help clarifying the brain system supporting spontaneous ToM.

Brain activity for spontaneous and explicit mentalizing in adults with autism spectrum disorder: An fMRI study.

The socio-communicative difficulties of individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are hypothesized to be caused by a specific deficit in the ability to represent one's own and others' mental states, referred to as Theory of Mind or mentalizing. However, many individuals with ASD show successful performance on explicit measures of mentalizing, and for this reason, the deficit is thought to be better captured by measures of spontaneous mentalizing. While there is initial behavioral support for this hypothesis, spontaneous mentalizing in ASD has not yet been studied at the neural level. Recent findings indicate involvement of the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) in both explicit and spontaneous mentalizing (Bardi et al., 2016). In the current study, we investigated brain activation during explicit and spontaneous mentalizing in adults with ASD by means of fMRI. Based on our hypothesis of a core mentalizing deficit in ASD, decreased rTPJ activity was expected for both forms of mentalizing. A group of 24 adults with ASD and 21 neurotypical controls carried out a spontaneous and an explicit version of the same mentalizing task. They watched videos in which both they themselves and another agent formed a belief about the location of an object (belief formation phase). Only in the explicit task version participants were instructed to report the agent's belief on some trials. At the behavioral level, no group differences were revealed in either of the task versions. A planned region-of-interest analysis of the rTPJ showed that this region was more active for false- than for true-belief formation, independent of task version, especially when the agent's belief had a positive content (when the agent was expecting the object). This effect of belief was absent in adults with ASD. A whole-brain analysis revealed reduced activation in the anterior middle temporal pole in ASD for false - versus true-belief trials, independent of task version. Our findings suggest neural differences between adults with ASD and neurotypical controls both during spontaneous and explicit mentalizing, and indicate the rTPJ to be crucially involved in ASD. Moreover, the possible role of the anterior middle temporal pole in disturbed mentalizing in ASD deserves further attention. The finding that these neural differences do not necessarily lead to differential performance warrants further research.

Sensory Prediction Errors Are Less Modulated by Global Context in Autism Spectrum Disorder.

BACKGROUND: Recent predictive coding accounts of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) suggest that a key deficit in ASD concerns the inflexibility in modulating local prediction errors as a function of global top-down expectations. As a direct test of this central hypothesis, we used electroencephalography to investigate whether local prediction error processing was less modulated by global context (i.e., global stimulus frequency) in ASD. METHODS: A group of 18 adults with ASD was compared with a group of 24 typically developed adults on a well-validated hierarchical auditory oddball task in which participants listened to short sequences of either five identical sounds (local standard) or four identical sounds and a fifth deviant sound (local deviant). The latter condition is known to generate the mismatch negativity (MMN) component, believed to reflect early sensory prediction error processing. Crucially, previous studies have shown that in blocks with a higher frequency of local deviant sequences, top-down expectations seem to attenuate the MMN. We predicted that this modulation by global context would be less pronounced in the ASD group. RESULTS: Both groups showed an MMN that was modulated by global context. However, this effect was smaller in the ASD group as compared with the typically developed group. In contrast, the P3b, as an electroencephalographic marker of conscious expectation processes, did not differ across groups. CONCLUSIONS: Our results demonstrate that people with ASD are less flexible in modulating their local predictions (reflected in MMN), thereby confirming the central hypothesis of contemporary predictive coding accounts of ASD.

Atypical neural responding to hearing one's own name in adults with ASD.

Diminished responding to hearing one's own name is one of the earliest and strongest predictors of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Here, we studied, for the first time, the neural correlates of hearing one's own name in ASD. Based on existing research, we hypothesized enhancement of late parietal positive activity specifically for the own name in neurotypicals, and for this effect to be reduced in adults with ASD. Source localization analyses were conducted to estimate group differences in brain regions underlying this effect. Twenty-one adults with ASD, and 21 age- and gender-matched neurotypicals were presented with 3 categories of names (own name, close other, unknown other) as task-irrelevant deviant stimuli in an auditory oddball paradigm while electroencephalogram was recorded. As expected, late parietal positivity was observed specifically for own names in neurotypicals, indicating enhanced attention to the own name. This preferential effect was absent in the ASD group. This group difference was associated with diminished activation in the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) in adults with ASD. Further, a familiarity effect was found for N1 amplitude, with larger amplitudes for familiar names (own name and close other). However, groups did not differ for this effect. These findings provide evidence of atypical neural responding to hearing one's own name in adults with ASD, suggesting a deficit in self-other distinction associated with rTPJ dysfunction. (PsycINFO Database Record

Spontaneous mentalizing in neurotypicals scoring high versus low on symptomatology of autism spectrum disorder.

Spontaneous mentalizing ability has been linked to symptoms severity in individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Here we investigated whether in neurotypicals, higher levels of ASD symptomatology could also be linked to lower levels of spontaneous mentalizing, by comparing neurotypicals scoring high with those scoring low on the short Autism Spectrum Quotient. Participants watched movies during which they, and another agent, formed beliefs about the location of an object. These beliefs could influence reaction times (RT) to that object in the outcome phase. We expected participants with more ASD symptoms to show less spontaneous mentalizing, as reflected by a smaller effect of the other agent's beliefs on RT patterns (the ToM index). In contrast, the effect of own beliefs on RTs, reflecting an egocentric bias, was expected to be larger in the high-scoring group. Results showed that groups differed in the effect of the agent's beliefs; the ToM index was highly significant in the low-scoring group, while being absent in the high-scoring group. No difference in egocentric bias was observed. These findings suggest that the relationship between levels of ASD symptomatology and spontaneous mentalizing is not only present in individuals with ASD, but also in the neurotypical population.

Measuring Mentalizing Ability: A Within-Subject Comparison between an Explicit and Implicit Version of a Ball Detection Task.

The concept of mentalizing has been widely studied, but almost exclusively through tasks with explicit instructions. Recent studies suggest that people also mentalize on a more implicit level. However, to our knowledge, no study to date has directly contrasted the effects of implicit and explicit mentalizing processes on an implicit dependent measure within-subjects. We implemented this by using two versions of an object detection task, differing only on secondary catch questions. We hypothesized that if explicit mentalizing relies on complementary processes beyond those underlying implicit mentalizing, this would be reflected in enhanced belief effects in the explicit version. Twenty-eight healthy adults watched movies in which, during the first phase, both they themselves and another agent formed a belief about the location of a ball, and although irrelevant, these beliefs could influence their ball detection reaction times in the second phase. After this response phase, there were occasional catch questions that were different for the explicit and implicit task version. Finally, self-report measures of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) symptomatology were included, as the literature suggests that ASD is related to a specific deficit in implicit mentalizing. Both in the explicit and implicit version, belief conditions had a significant effect on reaction times, with responses being slower when neither the participant nor the other agent expected the ball to be present compared to all other conditions. Importantly, after the implicit version, participants reported no explicit mentalizing awareness. In our neurotypical sample, ASD symptoms were not found to correlate with either explicit or implicit mentalizing. In conclusion, the reaction time patterns in the explicit and implicit version of the task show strikingly similar effects of mentalizing, indicating that participants processed beliefs to the same extent regardless of whether they mentalized explicitly or implicitly, with no additional effects for explicit processing.

Prediction During Natural Language Comprehension.

The notion of prediction is studied in cognitive neuroscience with increasing intensity. We investigated the neural basis of 2 distinct aspects of word prediction, derived from information theory, during story comprehension. We assessed the effect of entropy of next-word probability distributions as well as surprisal A computational model determined entropy and surprisal for each word in 3 literary stories. Twenty-four healthy participants listened to the same 3 stories while their brain activation was measured using fMRI. Reversed speech fragments were presented as a control condition. Brain areas sensitive to entropy were left ventral premotor cortex, left middle frontal gyrus, right inferior frontal gyrus, left inferior parietal lobule, and left supplementary motor area. Areas sensitive to surprisal were left inferior temporal sulcus ("visual word form area"), bilateral superior temporal gyrus, right amygdala, bilateral anterior temporal poles, and right inferior frontal sulcus. We conclude that prediction during language comprehension can occur at several levels of processing, including at the level of word form. Our study exemplifies the power of combining computational linguistics with cognitive neuroscience, and additionally underlines the feasibility of studying continuous spoken language materials with fMRI.

Simulating fiction: individual differences in literature comprehension revealed with FMRI.

When we read literary fiction, we are transported to fictional places, and we feel and think along with the characters. Despite the importance of narrative in adult life and during development, the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying fiction comprehension are unclear. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate how individuals differently employ neural networks important for understanding others' beliefs and intentions (mentalizing), and for sensori-motor simulation while listening to excerpts from literary novels. Localizer tasks were used to localize both the cortical motor network and the mentalizing network in participants after they listened to excerpts from literary novels. Results show that participants who had high activation in anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC; part of the mentalizing network) when listening to mentalizing content of literary fiction, had lower motor cortex activity when they listened to action-related content of the story, and vice versa. This qualifies how people differ in their engagement with fiction: some people are mostly drawn into a story by mentalizing about the thoughts and beliefs of others, whereas others engage in literature by simulating more concrete events such as actions. This study provides on-line neural evidence for the existence of qualitatively different styles of moving into literary worlds, and adds to a growing body of literature showing the potential to study narrative comprehension with neuroimaging methods.